This paper analyzes and compares the performance of different delegation schemes when the central bank has imperfect commitment. A continuum of loose commitment possibilities is considered ranging from full commitment to full discretion. The results show that the performance of inflation targeting improves substantially with higher commitment levels. On the other hand, the performance of other targeting regimes does not necessarily improve with the commitment level of the central bank. While it was previously thought that inflation targeting is inferior to other targeting regimes, the results show that it can be the best performing regime as long as the commitment level is not too low. These results may provide a theoretical explanation for the high popularity of inflation targeting among central banks.
Introduction
The optimal design of monetary institutions and objectives has received considerable attention both from academics and policymakers. Rogoff (1985) showed that if optimal monetary policy is time-inconsistent and the central bank operates under full discretion, then the central bank should be delegated objectives which are different than society's. More recent results regarding monetary policy (e.g. Clarida et al. (1999) among many others) have shown that even without an inflation bias it is still desirable to distort the central bank objectives in order to improve the short-run response to shocks (so-called stabilization bias).
The literature that has analyzed delegation and the stabilization bias typically assumed that central banks operate with full discretion. This seems to be, to some extent, unrealistic. Central banks may have some credibility problems, but assuming that central banks have no credibility at all seems to be rather extreme. Indeed, it is not clear that central banks lack commitment. Blinder (1998) stated that commitment problems are dealt with by "norms of behavior" (Blinder, 1998 p. 49 )".
Obviously if one considers that central banks have full commitment then there is no role for delegation. However, there is a role for delegation in a setting where there is a continuum of loose commitment possibilities ranging from full commitment to full discretion. In such setting, the central bank has partial commitment (or imperfect credibility to maintain promises). These loose commitment settings are modeled as in Roberds (1987) , Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007) , and Nunes (2007, 2008a) .
In this paper, I assume that the objectives of the central bank cannot be changed, unlike Debortoli and Nunes (2008a) . Thus, society can perfectly commit to a del-egation scheme.
1 Once central bank's objectives are set, instead of assuming that the central bank behaves with full discretion, I assume an imperfect commitment setting. In this context, the paper examines several delegation schemes and shows how their performance changes with the commitment level of the central bank.
An optimal precommitment policy (the best possible policy under full commitment) imparts inertia to policy even when expectations are purely forward-looking.
A central bank operating under full discretion will fail to introduce inertia. Because of this feature, delegation schemes often introduce an endogenous state-variable in the central bank objective function, which imparts inertia into a monetary policy even under full discretion. However, if the central bank has a modest degree of commitment it already imparts inertia into the system. In such a case, delegation schemes which introduce an endogenous state-variable may impart an excessive and detrimental amount of inertia. Due to this reason, the properties of the economy are likely to change substantially with intermediate degrees of commitment relative to the case of full discretion.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and different delegation schemes. Section 3 presents the main results. Section 4 examines alternative scenarios. Section 5 concludes.
The model
The analysis is based on a simple New Keynesian model. The New Keynesian
Phillips curve (NKPC) is a reduced form approximation of the relationship between inflation and output in an economy with monopolistic competition and staggered 1 For another recent analysis with objective changes see Korinek and Stiglitz (2008) .
price setting.
2 Throughout the paper, I assume a perfect information environment.
3
Following Galí and Gertler (1999) , I consider the possibility that the Phillips curve may also include a backward-looking term. The hybrid Phillips curve takes the form π t = κx t + αβE t π t+1 + (1 − α)βπ t−1 + u t
where π t denotes price inflation and x t = y t − y n t measures the output-gap, i.e. the difference between current output (y t ) and the output level that would prevail under flexible prices (y n t ). The natural output level (y n t ) follows an AR(1) process given by y n t = ρ y y n t−1 + ζ
where ζ y t is a mean-zero innovation with standard deviation σ y . The cost-push shock u t follows an AR(1) process given by
where ζ u t is a mean-zero innovation with standard deviation σ u . As is standard in the optimal monetary policy literature, it is assumed that the central bank controls inflation and the output-gap directly.
4 The welfare loss function of society is assumed to take the form
A few remarks about equation (4) are in order. First, the assumption of a zero inflation target is merely a convenient normalization. Second, such a loss function 2 The theoretical framework underlying such relationship is described for instance in Yun (1996) , Woodford (2003a) and Galí (2008) .
3 For two very interesting discussions of optimal monetary policy with imperfect information see Mertens (2007) and Kim and Henderson (2005) . 4 The interest rate i t required to implement the desired inflation level can be obtained from the demand side of the economy, not modeled here.
can under some circumstances be derived as an approximation to the utility function of a representative consumer in the case of a pure forward-looking NKPC. I will consider both a pure forward-looking and a hybrid NKPC. Most studies on delegation have assumed such a loss function even under inflation persistence. To allow comparability of results, I follow the same approach, and analyze how targeting regimes are affected by the introduction of imperfect commitment. Finally, in line with the related literature, I assume an output-gap target of zero. The potential gains from delegating targeting regimes are only due to an improved stabilization bias in response to shocks. Unlike in Rogoff (1985) , the potential gains from delegation do not accrue from correcting the inflation bias. Also, an output-gap target of zero does not introduce an incentive for monetary surprises in steady-state. In this case, the optimal precommitment policy and the non-optimal timeless perspective policy coincide. 
Loose commitment and imperfect credibility
Imperfect credibility or loose commitment is modeled as in Roberds (1987) . Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007) generalized Roberds (1987) results to linear quadratic settings and provided a very interesting application to monetary policy. Debortoli and Nunes (2007) provided proofs and extended the results to general dynamic-programming problems, and showed an application to fiscal policy. The central bank is assumed to be able to make a policy plan regarding future actions.
However, in future periods previous promises may either be fulfilled or reneged according to an exogenous stochastic probability. The central bank optimization problem is analogous to the firm problem facing an exogenous Calvo probability of being able to change prices.
6 This allows for tractability of the model, and still allows to analyze optimal policy in such settings. Both the private sector, and the central bank itself know that the policy plan is only expected to last for some periods (not known with certainty). When the policy plan breaks, a reoptimization occurs and a new plan is implemented. The parameter defining the expected duration of a plan determines the commitment level of the central bank. At one extreme, the plan is never kept and one is back to the full discretion solution. At the other extreme, the plan is known to be effective forever and one is back to the full commitment setup.
Such a setting characterizes situations when policymakers can guarantee their own promises but cannot influence the behavior of their successors, who are expected to formulate a new policy plan. Such situations are common given governor appointments in central banks and staff turnover. Moreover the same policymakers may, under some exogenous circumstances, reformulate and reoptimize their plans.
If plans are expected to last for (T ) periods with an i.i.d. exogenous probability (q) to be broken at any point in time, then the problem can be formulated as: The following equilibrium definition is employed:
Definition 1 A Markov Perfect Equilibrium solution of problem (5) must satisfy the following:
1. Given V and Ψ, the sequence {π t , x t } ∞ t=0 maximizes problem (5).
2. The value function V is the maximum of problem (5).
3. Define ψ(π t−1 , u t , λ t−1 ) to be the optimal policy function of inflation solving problem (5), where {λ t } ∞ t=0 is the sequence of lagrange-multipliers associated with the NKPC constraints. Then Ψ(π t−1 , u t ) = ψ(π t−1 , u t , 0).
We refer to a Markov Perfect Equilibrium, because Ψ only depends on the state variables (π t−1 , u t ). The first part of the definition states that, given the anticipated continuation value (V ) and private sector beliefs about the default policy (Ψ), the central bank is maximizing. The second part imposes that, when a default occurs, the central bank makes a new plan that is optimal attaining the maximum welfare value (V ).
9 The final part requires private sector beliefs about the default policy 8 If α = 1, then the cost-push shock is the only state-variable. 9 If central bank's objectives before and after defaulting do not coincide, then the second part of the definition should not hold. This corresponds to a case with alternating regimes or with political disagreement, which has been addressed in Debortoli and Nunes (2008a,b) .
to be correct and consistent with the optimal policy function implemented in such case. As Marcet and Marimon (1998) discuss, previous promises are summarized by the last-period lagrange-multiplier (λ t−1 ). In case of default, λ t−1 is reset to zero since previous promises are abandoned. Further details on this type of formulation can be found in Debortoli and Nunes (2007) .
Delegation schemes
Delegation schemes are modeled as a set of incentive mechanisms for central banks, which induce a behavior that aims at attaining various policy goals. (e.g. Rogoff (1985) , Walsh (1995) , Svensson (1997) ). These set of incentives are also known as targeting regimes. The targeting regimes considered are understood to be flexible, i.e. the central bank may optimally let variables be off target.
In related work, Debortoli and Nunes (2008a) consider that the imperfect credibility in the economy relates to changing monetary policy objectives. In this work, I consider that there is perfect credibility when implementing the targeting regime, however the central bank itself has imperfect credibility about committing to future policy actions. Hence, it is always assumed that society can fully commit to an institutional setup. This feature is subject to the McCallum (1995) critique of monetary delegation theories, since society itself would like to take control of policy once expectations are set. This paper only discusses targeting regimes where the relevant parameters (weights and targets) are constrained to be constant. As Beetsma and Jensen (1999) argue, a monetary institutional setup with characteristics that do not change with the business cycle is less subject to the McCallum (1995) critique.
10 In addition, as Walsh (2003a) describes, the temptation to renege on a targeting regime may be overcome due to the high embarrassment costs of overriding the publicly known targeting regime and the laws that enforce it. In this sense, it may be easy to commit to a targeting regime if it is explicitly and publicly adopted and enforced through a clear mandate.
The optimal benchmark for the delegation schemes is the policy that a central bank with full commitment would implement when minimizing the social welfare function. We denote this best possible scenario as the "optimal precommitment policy". As it is well known, in response to cost-push shocks the optimal precommitment policy implies a promise of a prolonged recession which induces a deflation.
The future deflation makes the current inflation to be dampened due to an expectations effect. The optimal policy is also inertial since the recession is less costly if it is small and prolonged rather than drastic and short-lived.
The first targeting regime considered is inflation targeting (IT), which was proposed in different forms, for instance, by Rogoff (1985) and Svensson (1997) . The period loss function under IT is:
It is well know that there are gains from IT even if the output-gap target is zero.
These gains accrue due to a more efficient response to cost-push shocks. Previous studies found that delegating an IT regime when the central bank has full discretion produces only limited welfare gains. Assigning ω IT ≤ ω, makes the central bank correct the impulse response function dampening more strongly inflation in the current and future periods. However, an inflation targeting regime fails to produce a deflation or to impart inertia into policy. Walsh (2003b) has proposed a speed limit targeting regime (SLT). In this case, 9 the period loss function is given by:
Walsh showed that in a full discretion environment a speed limit policy manages to induce persistence in policy. The lagged output-gap term induces history dependence, as in the optimal precommitment policy. In face of a positive cost-push shock, inflation rises and the output-gap becomes negative. After the impact response, the output-gap remains negative, because large changes in the output-gap carry a cost to the central bank. The persistent recession is associated with deflationary pressures. Therefore, even inflation in the initial period is well anchored due to expectations of low future inflation.
Jensen (2002) has proposed nominal income growth targeting (NIGT). The period loss function assigned to the central bank is given by:
This regime also induces inertia and history dependence into the system mimicking quite well the optimal precommitment policy. After the initial rise in inflation and drop in output, the recession is somewhat persistent to keep nominal income at target. Since the central bank would like to bring output back to steady state, output grows sluggishly. In order to attenuate the increase in nominal income the central bank has the incentive to keep future inflation quite low. In summary, the optimal precommitment patterns of future low inflation and a persistent recession are insured.
The optimal precommitment policy leaves the output-gap and inflation unchanged in response to shocks in the natural output level. 11 The NIGT regime 11 That is to say, output responds one-to-one to natural-output leaving the output-gap unchanged.
features an inefficient response to these type of shocks; the central bank fails to stabilize the output-gap completely as this conflicts with stabilizing nominal income.
Vestin (2006) describes in detail the benefits of a price-level targeting regime (PT).
After the initial rise in inflation and the price level, the central bank immediately entails a deflation to bring the price level back to target. In doing so, inflation in the first period is well anchored due to expectations of low future prices.
I have chosen these four targeting regimes because they have received considerable attention in the literature. For instance, Walsh (2003b) has analyzed the same targeting regimes, but considered only a full discretion setup. Also, for reasons discussed previously, I am focusing on delegation schemes with constant parameters.
Main Results
The calibration is set in table 1. The model is interpreted as being quarterly and the discount factor is set at 0.99. With a discount factor close to one the deviation from the strict natural-rate hypothesis is negligible. The elasticity of current inflation with respect to the output gap is set at 0.1. This value is in line with Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) (2002) and Walsh (2003b) .
The properties and performance of targeting regimes when the central bank has imperfect commitment have not been studied before, and I carry out such analysis in 12 The upper panel plots the relative change in loss with respect to the optimal precommitment policy. 13 The middle panel follows Jensen (2002) and plots the permanent output-gap yielding the same absolute change in loss.
14 Each line corresponds to a different targeting regime. The welfare achieved by society depends on the expected commitment duration (T ), which is plotted in the horizontal axis. When (T = 1) the usual full discretion results are recovered, and when (T = ∞) the central bank has full commitment. The lower panel plots the optimal weights, which depend on the expected commitment duration.
When the central bank acts with full discretion, IT is the worst performing targeting regime with a relative loss of 17%. SLT performs the best, followed by NIGT and PT. However, the results change substantially if one considers that the promises of the central bank are expected to last for some periods. If the central bank has partial commitment, the welfare attained by IT starts to improve drastically.
Even if the expected commitment duration is relatively low, the welfare attained by society under IT becomes very close to the welfare obtained with the optimal 12 Unconditional welfare was computed as in Jensen (2002) . The results are robust if one considers welfare conditional on the initial state-vector being on steady-state. A numerical package that solves for optimal policy with loose commitment settings is documented and provided in Debortoli et al. (2008) . The appendix describes the numerical algorithm and the first-order-conditions.
13 That is to say, (L − L OP P )/L OP P , where L OP P is the optimal precommitment policy loss, and L is the loss of a specific targeting regime for a given T .
14 In other words, the middle panel plots c such that (
precommitment policy. In the extreme case in which the central bank has full commitment, IT attains the highest possible welfare. In such a case, it is optimal to make the objectives of the central bank and society to coincide, ω IT = ω. Another observation is that if society delegates objectives which dramatically differ from the original ones, then the central bank should not try to improve its commitment and credibility over time. In case it does so, these "optimal" policy efforts could very well reduce society's welfare. For instance, consider two economies:
in economy A the central bank is incompetent and operates under (T = 1), in economy B, the central bank due to a better communication strategy or enhanced accountability achieves a higher expected commitment duration, say (T = 10).
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The welfare of society when implementing a SLT, NIGT or PT regime is higher in the economy where the central bank is incompetent. This effect can be rather perversive, leading central banks to justify poor performance.
Inflation Targeting
The first column of figure (2) The last column of figure (2) displays the optimal precommitment policy, and The optimal delegated weight ω IT increases with T , and if T = ∞ then ω IT = ω.
As the central bank gains more commitment the positive effects of distorting the central bank objectives diminish. The optimal delegated speed limit policy when T = 1 tracks quite well the optimal precommitment policy. However, if the central bank is more competent, then the optimal delegated speed limit policy does not match as closely what society would desire. As a consequence, society's welfare would be higher if the central bank would be less competent.
Speed Limit Targeting
The optimal delegated weight (ω SLT ) when T = 1 is smaller than when T > 1.
Since the central bank with more commitment promises more prolonged recessions, society partially offsets this effect by reducing ω SLT . Note: The first column plots the IRF for a positive one standard deviation costpush shock under IT and the baseline calibration. The IRFs plotted correspond to three levels of commitment of the central bank, T ∈ {0, 20, ∞} for w IT = 0.25. When T = 20, the IRF is dependent on the particular realization of "default" or "no default". The expected IRF is computed by averaging 1000 histories. The middle column plots two particular histories. The first IRF corresponds to the history where the central bank always kept past promises. In the second history, the central bank keeps past promises until period 4 and defaults always thereafter. The third column plots the IRF for the optimal precommitment policy, and the IRF for the optimal delegation when T ∈ {0, 20}. Note: The first column plots the IRF for a positive one standard deviation costpush shock under SL and the baseline calibration. The IRFs plotted correspond to three levels of commitment of the central bank, T ∈ {0, 20, ∞} for w SL = 0.25. When T = 20, the IRF is dependent on the particular realization of "default" or "no default". The expected IRF is computed by averaging 1000 histories. The middle column plots two particular histories. The first IRF corresponds to the history where the central bank always kept past promises. In the second history, the central bank keeps past promises until period 4 and defaults always thereafter. The third column plots the IRF for the optimal precommitment policy, and the IRF for the optimal delegation when T ∈ {0, 20}. As a consequence, in the initial periods output is higher than optimal, and in later periods it is lower than optimal. Since output is too low in later periods, the deflation is too strong.
Nominal Income Growth Targeting
The optimal delegated weight ω N IGT is lower when T is higher. As society anticipates a stronger response of output when the central bank is more competent, society delegates objectives that give more importance to output (lower ω N IGT ).
Price Level Targeting
The IRF under PT are plotted in Figure (5 ). The first column shows that, once again, when the central bank has the ability to make a commitment plan, it promises a more prolonged recession. The central bank realizes that the current price level can be further controlled if future inflation is expected to be low. If the central bank would default on its promises then the recession would immediately become milder and the reduction in prices would be slower (displayed in the middle column). Note: The first column plots the IRF for a positive one standard deviation cost-push shock under NIGT and the baseline calibration. The IRFs plotted correspond to three levels of commitment of the central bank, T ∈ {0, 20, ∞} for w N IGT = 0.25. When T = 20, the IRF is dependent on the particular realization of "default" or "no default". The expected IRF is computed by averaging 1000 histories. The middle column plots two particular histories. The first IRF corresponds to the history where the central bank always kept past promises. In the second history, the central bank keeps past promises until period 4 and defaults always thereafter. The third column plots the IRF for the optimal precommitment policy, and the IRF for the optimal delegation when T ∈ {0, 20}.
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The final column in figure (5) displays the optimal delegated policies for different commitment levels. The extra inertia induced by commitment is once again not an advantage to society. On impact the negative output-gap response is too moderate, and then due to inertia the recession becomes too strong. As a counterpart, inflation becomes too low after some periods inducing a non-optimal cost of a disinflation.
Since extra commitment makes the central bank respond more strongly on output, it is not surprising that, for instance, ω P T (T = 20) is higher than ω P T (T = 1). One difference that occurs is that welfare with SLT and NIGT can also be increasing with the level of commitment. The intuition of this result is the following.
Sensitivity Analysis
As Jensen (2002) and Walsh (2003b) point out, both of these delegation schemes do not impart enough inertia into policy. 17 Even with optimally chosen weights, Note: The first column plots the IRF for a positive one standard deviation costpush shock under PT and the baseline calibration. The IRFs plotted correspond to three levels of commitment of the central bank, T ∈ {0, 20, ∞} for w P T = 0.25. When T = 20, the IRF is dependent on the particular realization of "default" or "no default". The expected IRF is computed by averaging 1000 histories. The middle column plots two particular histories. The first IRF corresponds to the history where the central bank always kept past promises. In the second history, the central bank keeps past promises until period 4 and defaults always thereafter. The third column plots the IRF for the optimal precommitment policy, and the IRF for the optimal delegation when T ∈ {0, 20}. Note: In all panels, the horizontal axis refers to expected commitment duration (T). For each targeting regime with optimally chosen weights, the upper panel plots the society's loss relative to the optimal precommitment policy, i.e. (L −L OP P )/L OP P . The optimal policy precommitment policy loss (L OP P ) was found to be -0.926 (×100). The middle panel follows Jensen (2002) and plots the permanent outputgap yielding an equivalent change in loss, i.e. it plots c such that (L OP P − L ) = 
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the response of output is initially too strong and fades out too quickly. But when the central bank has more commitment, then it imparts more inertia into policy.
Obviously, the central bank is doing this in order to maximize its assigned objectives instead of society's. But society finds it very useful that the central bank reacts in that way because it imparts more inertia into policy and allows society to achieve a higher welfare. These results contradict the ones for the benchmark calibration, in which the economy already has a high degree of backward-looking behavior. In the benchmark case, having more commitment increases the level of policy inertia even further into levels that make it hard to mimic the optimal precommitment policy.
The behavior of price level targeting is slightly different. Vestin (2006) showed that for the pure forward-looking NKPC price level targeting can actually mimic the optimal precommitment policy. In that case, the amount of inertia in the central bank policy under full discretion is already optimal. Increasing inertia due to commitment worsens welfare.
Conclusions
Previous analysis of monetary policy delegation and institutional design had assumed that the central bank operates under full discretion (e.g. Clarida et al. (1999) , Jensen (2002) , Walsh (2003b) , Vestin (2006) ). Such an assumption is rather restrictive. In practice, central bank's credibility or commitment may be imperfect but not necessarily inexistent.
Insofar as the central bank is partially credible, society can still be better-off by delegating objectives to the central bank. However, the performance of a delegation scheme will depend on whether the central bank operates with intermediate commitment or full discretion. This paper examined how delegation schemes mitigate the stabilization bias for a continuum of commitment levels that range from full discretion to full commitment. The imperfect credibility or loose commitment settings were modeled as in Roberds (1987) , Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007) , and Debortoli and Nunes (2007) . These results suggest that delegating objectives to the central bank that differ substantially from the society's objectives may be less beneficial than previously thought. In addition, doing so could potentially deter the central bank from behaving competently and trying to improve its credibility. In fact, for the baseline calibration and all delegation schemes except inflation targeting, an economy with an incompetent central bank can be better off than an economy with a competent one. It was also found that, for plausible levels of commitment, inflation targeting can become the best performing regime. If the commitment of the central bank is expected to last more than 10 quarters, then society's welfare under inflation targeting is the highest. In that sense, this paper may provide a rationale for why central banks have increasingly adopted inflation targeting. In previous research, the theoretical evidence of inflation targeting as a relatively inefficient targeting regime could not account for the widespread practice and high popularity of inflation targeting among central banks. Note: The first column plots the IRF for a positive one standard deviation cost-push shock under IT and the baseline calibration except that α = 1. The IRFs plotted correspond to three levels of commitment of the central bank, T ∈ {0, 20, ∞} for w IT = 0.25. When T = 20, the IRF is dependent on the particular realization of "default" or "no default". The expected IRF is computed by averaging 1000 histories. The middle column plots two particular histories. The first IRF corresponds to the history where the central bank always kept past promises. In the second history, the central bank keeps past promises until period 4 and defaults always thereafter. The third column plots the IRF for the optimal precommitment policy, and the IRF for the optimal delegation when T ∈ {0, 20}. Note: The first column plots the IRF for a positive one standard deviation cost-push shock under SL and the baseline calibration except that α = 1. The IRFs plotted correspond to three levels of commitment of the central bank, T ∈ {0, 20, ∞} for w SL = 0.25. When T = 20, the IRF is dependent on the particular realization of "default" or "no default". The expected IRF is computed by averaging 1000 histories. The middle column plots two particular histories. The first IRF corresponds to the history where the central bank always kept past promises. In the second history, the central bank keeps past promises until period 4 and defaults always thereafter. The third column plots the IRF for the optimal precommitment policy, and the IRF for the optimal delegation when T ∈ {0, 20}. Note: The first column plots the IRF for a positive one standard deviation cost-push shock under NIGT and the baseline calibration except that α = 1. The IRFs plotted correspond to three levels of commitment of the central bank, T ∈ {0, 20, ∞} for w N IGT = 0.25. When T = 20, the IRF is dependent on the particular realization of "default" or "no default". The expected IRF is computed by averaging 1000 histories. The middle column plots two particular histories. The first IRF corresponds to the history where the central bank always kept past promises. In the second history, the central bank keeps past promises until period 4 and defaults always thereafter. The third column plots the IRF for the optimal precommitment policy, and the IRF for the optimal delegation when T ∈ {0, 20}. Note: The first column plots the IRF for a positive one standard deviation cost-push shock under PT and the baseline calibration except that α = 1. The IRFs plotted correspond to three levels of commitment of the central bank, T ∈ {0, 20, ∞} for w P T = 0.25. When T = 20, the IRF is dependent on the particular realization of "default" or "no default". The expected IRF is computed by averaging 1000 histories. The middle column plots two particular histories. The first IRF corresponds to the history where the central bank always kept past promises. In the second history, the central bank keeps past promises until period 4 and defaults always thereafter. The third column plots the IRF for the optimal precommitment policy, and the IRF for the optimal delegation when T ∈ {0, 20}.
A.2 Numerical algorithm solving loose commitment problems
The policy functions of certain variables, in case of default, appear in the constraints of the problem. In addition, the future value functions also appear explicitly in the problem. 
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I first solved the full commitment problem, and then used an homothopy to solve the loose commitment problems until full discretion. This procedure guarantees that 18 Debortoli and Nunes (2007) proposed a global solution method with one fix point problem. The problem in this paper is simpler since it is linear quadratic, and can be efficiently solved relying on two fix points (one fix point in the default policies guess, and a second fix point in the rational expectations solution). An iterative procedure for the full discretion case is available in Dennis (2007) . the initial guess is always accurate. Following the discussion in Blake and Kirsanova (2008) , I have not found evidence of multiple solutions. An implementation of this algorithm is available in Debortoli et al. (2008) .
A.3 First Order Conditions
The FOCs of each targeting regime are obtained by solving a problem similar to −ω P T x t + λ t κ = 0 (A-11) −p t + p t−1 + kx t + β (1 − α) (p t−1 − p t−2 ) +βqαE t (p t+1 − p t ) + βα (1 − q) (E t p D t+1 − p t ) + u t = 0 (A-12) 
